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Abstract: 
There has been no clear evidence about whether organizational investment works for countering 
occupational fraud, and where to focus the investment if it works. In this regard, the present study 
explored the mediating roles of ethical culture and monitoring control in the ‘organizational 
investment-occupational fraud’ linkage. Using a sample of 392 Korean banking employees, a series 
of structural equation models were estimated. The results showed that the perception of increased 
investment in anti-occupational fraud enhanced two mediating variables, ethical culture and 
monitoring control. However, only the perception of an improved ethical culture was negatively 
related to the perceived frequency of occupational fraud with statistical significance. These findings 
imply that investing in ethical culture is more effective in preventing occupational fraud. 
Keywords: Occupational fraud, Anti-occupational fraud investment, Ethical corporate culture, 
Monitoring control, Fraud triangle 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial system of a country is the lifeblood of the economy. Commercial banking is a significant 
part of the financial system, providing core financial services such as savings accounts, investments, 
loans, mortgages and other services to ordinary people (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). The 
employees who serve these banking institutions are exposed to a range of opportunities to commit 
financial crimes and related acts (Hollow, 2014; Mitchell et al., 1992). White-collar crimes in the 
banking sector breach public trust in the financial system and can have a very detrimental effect on 
the whole economy. For example, the Savings and Loan (hereafter, S&L) scandal in the 1980s in the 
US had a significant impact on the economy. This debacle is regarded as the worst archetype of 
white-collar crime because fraud and illegal activities involving executives and managers of S&L 
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institutions were so prevalent that they led to financial catastrophe (Friedrich, 2010). The directors 
and managers of S&L institutions threw extravagant parties and purchased luxury villas or yachts 
from embezzled money, which represented acute moral hazard. The debacle led some to conclude 
that “the best way to rob a bank is to own one” and the term ‘collective embezzlement’ was coined 
to explain the failure of the financial institutions (Black, 2013; Calavita and Pontell, 1991). 
South Korea (hereafter, Korea) is also not immune from white-collar crime within its banking 
institutions. In 2011, more than 20 savings banks went bankrupt or were suspended by the financial 
authority due to occupational fraud and illegal activities (Min, 2012). The number of victims reached 
100,000 people with losses estimated at around $26 billion. The crisis ended with many working-
class families losing their life-long savings and in some cases tragic loss of life, by some committing 
suicide (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2012). The collapse of the financial institutions was attributed to 
internal fraud and corruption. For instance, the elder brother of the then Korean President and a 
leading congressman were arrested for receiving bribes from the director of a savings bank (KBS 
News, 2012). Aside from the savings bank scandal, official statistics recorded 147 embezzlement 
cases by bank employees in Korea, amounting to £30.6 million between 2011 and 2015. The average 
loss to embezzlement by bank employees was estimated at £210,000 per case (Kim, 2015). 
Despite the very serious and significant impacts on society, empirical studies on occupational fraud 
in the financial sector have been very limited. To bridge the paucity of information, this study 
surveyed 392 Korean banking sector employees with respect to their perception and experience of 
occupational fraud in their organization. Although previous studies attempted to discover what 
control mechanisms (e.g., background checks, hotline, risk assessment, audit, etc.) are effective in 
preventing and detecting fraud (Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; 
Kummer et al., 2015; Tunley et al., 2017), few studies have tried to investigate the impact of 
‘organizational investment’ on occupational fraud. Furthermore, Murphy and Free (2016) called for 
more research on the relationship between ‘ethical culture/climate’ and ‘fraud.’ They argued that 
the current framework, the Fraud Triangle, has a limited scope of analysis by just diagnosing fraud as 
the problem committed by immoral individuals who should be ‘monitored’ through control 
mechanisms; this has led to assess fraud risk in a narrow approach focusing only on monitoring 
aspects. Therefore, the current study not only attempts to fill the gap of research on ‘organizational 
investment,’ but also to contribute to anti-fraud community by simultaneously exploring the effects 
of ‘ethical culture’ and ‘monitoring effectiveness’ on occupational fraud, in which lies the novelty 
and significance of the study. Following an explanation of the background, method and findings of 
the study, its implications and limitations are considered.  
 
2. Literature review 
2. 1. Occupational fraud and the Fraud Triangle  
Occupational fraud is sometimes called ‘internal,’ ‘insider,’ or ‘employee’ fraud (Bonny et al., 2015; 
Edge, 2016; Gunduz and Onder, 2013; Rossi, 2012) or just referred to as fraud (Holtfreter, 2005a, 
2005b, 2008; Murphy and Free, 2016). The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the 
world’s biggest anti-fraud organization defines ‘occupational fraud’ as “the use of one’s occupation 
for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization’s resources or assets” (ACFE, 2012: 6-7). Therefore, ‘occupational fraud’ is fraud against 
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an organization committed by members of an organization, which range from ordinary employees 
through to managers to executives. It entails three categories: (1) asset misappropriation, which 
includes the theft or misuse of an organization’s asset; (2) corruption, where employees use their 
influence in business transaction to obtain unauthorized benefits contrary to their duties to 
employers; (3) fraudulent financial statements, which normally involve making reported financial 
statements look better than they really are (ACFE, 2012; Albrecht et al., 2015; Holtfreter, 2005b; 
Wells, 1997). 
Holtfreter (2005b) found that the individuals who committed ‘fraudulent statements’ were more 
likely to be older, educated males with managerial positions conforming to the high status image of 
‘white-collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1961), whereas those perpetrated ‘asset misappropriation’ or 
‘corruption’ more closely resembled ‘middle-class’ offenders (Weisburd et al., 1991); in terms of 
organizational characteristics, ‘asset misappropriation’ was committed significantly more often in 
smaller organizations, whereas ‘corruption’ occurred in larger organizations more frequently. The 
definition and typology of ‘occupational fraud’ developed by the ACFE has provided an especially 
powerful way of analyzing white-collar crime at a workplace level and many previous studies 
adopted the ACFE’s definition and typology for their analysis of fraud (Greenlee et al., 2007; 
Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; Timofeyev, 2015). When fraud is 
commonly referred in this paper, the authors also adopt the concept of ‘occupational fraud’ by the 
ACFE.  
According to the ACFE’s biennial reports, almost every organization is a victim of occupational fraud 
and the typical organization loses approximately 5 percent of its annual revenue with the median 
loss of one case estimated at around $150,000 (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Therefore, studying what 
works for countering it is very important. Cressey’s Fraud Triangle Theory depicts that there is a high 
probability of fraud when pressure (incentive), opportunity, and rationalization (attitude) 
intermingle at the same time (Cressey, 1953; Wells, 1997). However, some imply that all three 
elements only apply to ‘first time’ or ‘accidental’ offenders and not to repeat offenders, who are 
known as ‘predators.’ In the case of the latter, only one condition is necessary to commit fraud, 
which is opportunity (Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012). Although challenges and caveats have been 
made to the Fraud Triangle (Lokanan, 2015; Schuchter and Levi, 2016), the theory is established as a 
useful framework not only for assessing the risk of fraud but also for presenting ways of countering 
fraud (AICPA, 2002). For example, ‘opportunity’ can be reduced by strengthening control 
mechanisms to increase the probability of detection and punishment in organizations (ACFE, 2015; 
Albrecht et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012).  
Furthermore, having an ethical culture/climate is suggested as a solution to eliminate the other 
elements of the Triangle, ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ (Murphy and Free, 2016; Dorminey et al., 
2010; Rodgers et al., 2015). The individual level ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ have been hard to 
observe because both are happening in a subjective human mind. Moreover, only occupational 
offenders actually experience the concurrence of the three elements by actually committing fraud, 
whilst normal employees do not often encounter them simultaneously. This hence made empirical 
studies of all three elements very complicated (Schuchter and Levi, 2016). However, if the unit of 
analysis is converted to the organizational level, ‘ethical corporate culture’ can be a proxy measure 
which is negatively associated with the strength of ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ in a company 
(Dorminey et al., 2010; Murphy and Free, 2016). Despite the suggested link between the ethical 
culture and the two elements, empirical analysis for this expanded solution cannot be found in the 
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extant literature. In this regard, the present study endeavours to enlarge Fraud Triangle Theory by 
measuring ‘monitoring effectiveness’ and ‘ethical culture’ in organizations rather than directly 
assessing individual offender’s perceived ‘pressure,’ ‘opportunity,’ and ‘rationalization.’  
2. 2. Deterrence and monitoring control 
Traditionally, deterrence was stressed as a way of combatting crime. The more certain, severe, and 
swifter the punishment can be perceived by individuals, the more deterrence of crimes can be 
achieved as a corollary of perceptual deterrence (Erickson et al., 1977; Paternoster, 1989). Especially, 
between the certainty and severity of punishment, many agree that perceived certainty is more 
effective in deterring crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Hollinger and Clark, 1983). Interestingly, a 
deterrence/rational choice theory would be more suitable in understanding occupational fraud 
because corporations are normally composed of rational individuals who want to maximize profits 
(Simpson et al., 2013). This approach, therefore, mainly utilized methods to swell the perceived 
certainty of detection by focusing on monitoring and surveillance in organizations. In order to 
monitor and discover insider fraud, traditional methods such as internal/external auditing have been 
utilized in many companies although those measures sometimes necessitated time-consuming 
investigations and adequate organizational investments (Button and Gee, 2013). 
However, with the rapid growth of IT technology, computerized fraud monitoring systems have 
emerged using advanced information techniques to detect fraud and track fraudsters in a real time 
basis (Giles, 2012). For example, a constant monitoring programme (also called as fraud pattern 
analysis) was implemented to identify anomalies, triggering points, and risk indicators using large 
data sets in many financial institutions. This programme searches for red flags that require further 
investigation and enables management or auditors to identify fraudulent activity much quicker, 
thereby reducing the cost of fraud (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Plus, auditing software and 
programmes have significantly advanced to find evidence of fraud more precisely using state of the 
art technology (Singleton and Singleton, 2010). The Korean banking industry has also adopted this 
technological innovation to strengthen its capacity of detection of occupational fraud (Datanet, 
2015).  
2. 3. Ethical culture  
The COSO internal control system that most organizations are currently implementing was 
established in response to the S&L Debacle, in reflection of the limited capability of traditional 
control mechanisms and to further integrate ‘ethical culture’ into the control system (Alleyne and 
Amaria, 2015; Singleton and Singleton, 2010). Trevino defines ethical culture as “a subset of 
organizational culture, representing a multidimensional interplay among various formal and informal 
systems of behavioral control that are capable of promoting ethical behavior” (Trevino et al., 1998: 
451). Schwartz (2013) argued that three essential elements must be present if illegal or unethical 
activities are to be minimized through maintaining an ethical corporate culture. The three elements 
entail (1) the existence of core ethical values embedded throughout the corporation in its policies, 
process, and practices; (2) the establishment of a formal ethics programme such as ethics training; (3) 
the continuous presence of ethical leadership, which is an appropriate ‘tone at the top’ as reflected 
by the board of directors and senior managers. By the same token, Button and Brooks (2009) 
maintained that there are three main factors that affect anti-fraud culture in organizations: (1) a 
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clear statement of ethical behaviour; (2) staff vetting such as background checks to create an honest 
work-environment; (3) maintaining a positive working morale by such as good salary, all of which 
require adequate investments in the organizations.  
2. 4. Anti-occupational fraud investment  
Findings from a Global Survey of Economic Crime showed that the number of controls and detection 
measures in organizations was one of the most significant explanatory variables for the detection of 
crimes in an organization (Bussman and Werle, 2006). For example, companies that reported no 
victimization had significantly fewer controls while companies assigning more employees to control 
related tasks were more likely to detect possible fraud (Choi et al., 2013). Lee (2013) also found that 
the percentage of personnel responsible for monitoring financial statement fraud is positively 
associated with a good earnings ‘quality’: where company earnings are comprised of real cash flows 
rather than account receivables. Other studies have also implicated a high probability of 
occupational fraud when employees feel underpaid by a company or insecure about their job 
stability (Greenberg, 1990; Lawrence and Kacmar, 2017).  
However, the hidden and secretive nature of occupational fraud makes it difficult for executives or 
directors of companies to realize the necessity of investments in countering occupational fraud. If 
one inventory item was misappropriated by an employee and the profit margin is 20 percent in the 
company, the losses can be recovered only after selling 5 additional items at a regular price (ACFE, 
2015). In a fiercely contested market situation, a competitive advantage can therefore be achieved 
by investing in anti-occupational fraud to reduce this hidden cost associated with fraud (Button and 
Gee, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the impact of organizational investment for countering occupational fraud has not 
been well explained in the previous literature. In this regard, we attempted to discover the impact of 
organizational investment in financial institutions, where occupational fraud reported most 
frequently out of all industries (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Some studies suggested that organizational 
investment might depend on several factors such as the strategy, size, and leadership of 
organizations (Bentley et al., 2013; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982; Tunley et al., 2017) implying a 
multidimensional interplay among various factors in corporate culture. However, given the 
exploratory nature of the study, we have assumed anti-occupational fraud investment as an 
exogenous variable and attempt to see its influences on mediating and endogenous variables 
sequentially. 
 
From the literature review so far, we have developed the following hypotheses for the present study. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the perceived investment in anti-
occupational fraud and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
Hypothesis 2A: If the employees agree more that proper budget and human resources are 
invested in anti-occupational fraud, then they feel that ethical culture is stronger in their 
organization. 
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Hypothesis 2B: If the employees agree more that proper budget and human resources are 
invested in anti-occupational fraud, then they feel that the effectiveness of monitoring 
control is higher in their organization. 
Hypothesis 3A: There is a negative relationship between the perceived ethical corporate 
culture and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
Hypothesis 3B: There is a negative relationship between the perceived effectiveness of 
monitoring control and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
 
In figure 2, our analysis model is presented based on these hypotheses. The relationships between 
variables are depicted by a solid line (positive effect) or a dotted line (negative effect). In order to 
maximize the visibility of the model, control variables are not described.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Respective path hypotheses. 
 
Notes: latent variable = circle, observed variable = square; solid line (—) = positive effect, dashed line (---) = negative effect 
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3. Research method 
3. 1. Sampling and data 
For data collection, a quota sampling method was administered to the employees in the Korean 
banking industry from June to September 2016. The survey questionnaire utilized a web-based 
platform easily accessed via social network and email services through mobile phone or any 
computers. An informed consent form was posted on the opening webpage notifying their 
participation was voluntary and confidential. A total of 444 responses were collected but only 392 
were usable for the analysis because of missing values in some returns. The full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) method was utilized for the missing values, which is evaluated as the 
best technique to minimize a bias regardless of their distribution (Enders, 2006; Schafer and Graham, 
2002). Six different types of banking institutions were included in the sample: (1) nationwide bank 
(45%), (2) regional bank (7%), (3) local agricultural & fishery cooperative bank (21%), (4) community 
credit bank (8%), (5) credit union bank (15%), and (6) savings bank (5%); these percentages 
represent a similar proportion of the bank employee population in Korea. In addition, the 
organizational characteristics of the respondents include the followings: (1) 68 percent had less than 
5,000 employees; (2) 82 percent had an anti-occupational fraud department in the bank; (3) 48 
percent respondents were working for the second financial sector (community banks) whilst the 
others were working for the first financial sector (commercial banks).  
 
 
 
Table 3: Sample size by the type of depository financial institutions in Korea  
Financial sector Type Subtype Sample size 
The first sector Commercial banks 
Nationwide bank 177(44.8%) 
Regional bank 28(7.1%) 
The second 
sector 
Credit unions 
Local agricultural & fishery 
cooperatives bank 
81(20.5%) 
Community credit bank 32(8.1%) 
Credit union bank 58(14.7%) 
Savings institutions Savings bank 19(4.8%) 
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3. 2. Measurement of variables 
3.2.1. Endogenous variable 
To capture the endogenous variable, ‘the perceived frequency of occupational fraud,’ we developed 
a single item by directly asking respondents how many occupational frauds had occurred in their 
bank within the last five years. The response ranged from 0 to 10 and the mean was 3.45 with a 
standard deviation of 2.589. Following West et al. (1996), the normal distribution assumption was 
satisfied. The frequency responses were directly utilized for the analysis without any change. 
3.2.2. Exogenous variable 
The exogenous variable, ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ was measured with two items using 5 
point-Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). One item focused on responses to the 
levels of budgetary investment through the statement: “I perceive that the amount of funding 
dedicated in my organization to fight against occupational fraud is appropriate.” This produced a 
mean of 3.06, and a standard deviation of 0.994. The second item collected responses on human 
resource investment through the statement: “I perceive that the amount of human resources 
dedicated in my organization to fight against occupational fraud is appropriate.” This produced a 
mean of 3.03 and a standard deviation of 1.01. All items satisfied the normal distribution and were 
loaded as one factor. 
3.2.3. Mediating variables 
One of the mediating variables, ‘ethical corporate culture’ was measured by 3 items with 5 point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) adapted from the Schwartz’s study (2013). The 
reliability of the scale was high with a Cronbach’s α of 0.870. One item was about the presence of 
ethical leadership using the following statement: “Proper tone at the top such as management’s 
honesty and integrity is well established.” This produced a mean of 3.28 and a standard deviation of 
1.13. The respondents were then asked about their ethical culture: “A strong ethical corporate 
culture exists in the bank,” which produced a mean of 3.58 and a standard deviation of 1.12. Finally, 
the respondents were asked about the core ethical values such as workplace integrity: “The integrity 
of my workplace is high.” produced a mean of 3.87 and a standard deviation of 1.00. All three items 
were normally distributed and were loaded as one factor. 
The other mediating variable, ‘effectiveness of monitoring control’ was specified by 4 items with 5-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) adapted from the study of Dorminey et al 
(2010, 2012). The reliability of the scale was very high with a Cronbach’s α of 0.938. The four items 
are (1) “Internal control system is well designed (mean = 3.71, standard deviation = 0.95).”; (2) 
“Internal control system is in good operation as designed (mean = 3.66, standard deviation = 0.96).”; 
(3) “Continuous monitoring system is in good operation (mean = 3.79, standard deviation = 0.99).”; 
(4) “Auditing tools and programmes in our bank are effective (mean = 3.70, standard deviation = 
1.01).” All items were normally distributed and confirmed as one factor. 
3.2.3. Control variables 
For our study, the unit of analysis was set at the organizational level. Therefore, only the 
organizational characteristics of the respondents were included. Three organizational characteristics 
and five different bank types were coded as a dummy variable. The three organizational variables 
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included: (1) the size of organization1 (1 = small & medium sized, 0 = large; mean = 0.68), (2) the 
existence of anti-occupational fraud department in the bank (1 = yes, 0 = no; mean = 0.82), and (3) 
working for the second financial sector (1 = yes, 0 = no; mean = 0.48). The size of organization was 
selected as a control variable because previous studies indicated that crime is related to the size and 
influence of organizations (Coleman, 1987; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). The existence of anti-
occupational fraud department was chosen because the authors believed that it is related to anti-
fraud strategy of organizations (Bentley et al. 2013). Lastly, the unique characteristics of the financial 
sector were controlled to prevent any confounding effects on the endogenous variable. In the model, 
the savings bank was designated as reference group and 5 types of different banks were all dummy 
coded: (1) nationwide bank (=1, non-nationwide bank = 0; mean = 0.45), (2) regional bank (= 1, non-
regional bank = 0; mean = 0.07), (3) local agricultural & fishery cooperatives bank (= 1, non-local 
agricultural & fishery cooperatives bank = 0; mean = 0.20), (4) community credit bank (= 1, non-
community credit bank = 0; mean = 0.08), (5) credit union bank (= 1, non-credit union bank= 0; mean 
= 0.15). 
 
4. Findings 
4. 1. Analysis strategy 
The general two-stage approach of structural equation modeling (SEM) was adopted. Firstly, a 
preliminary test was conducted through a measurement model to check the acceptability of 
whether to proceed to the next stage. For that, we examined all the values of standardized factor 
coefficient, R-Square, and bivariate correlation. Secondly, a structural model estimated not only the 
direct pathway linking ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ to ‘the perceived frequency,’ but also 
the mediating effects of two respective variables (‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘effectiveness of 
monitoring control’). Bias-corrected (BC) bootstrapping methods were utilized to minimize the 
concern about the normal distribution assumption and the probability of type I error. In addition, 
the fixed coefficient models were estimated to reduce the concern regarding the independence 
assumption by six different bank types being dummy coded. The Mplus 7.0 programme was utilized 
for our analysis. 
4. 2. Measurement model 
A total of three latent constructs were included in the measurement model, showing the acceptable 
model fit indices: root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.051, comparative fit index 
(CFI) = 0.991, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = 0.987, and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) 
= 0.015. Moreover, the values of standardized factor coefficients ranged from 0.805 to 0.916 and all 
were statistically significant (p < 0.001). The respective values of R-Square ranged from 0.648 to 
0.875 indicating an acceptable explanatory power. 
Table 4 demonstrates the values of bivariate correlations among the latent variables. Given that all 
correlation values were below 0.80, no collinearity issue was found (Byrne, 2012). As predicted by 
our theoretical model, the relationships were all positively correlated among the latent variables. 
                                                          
1
 If the total number of employees is less than 5,000 (mean in the sample) in the banking institution, it was categorized as a 
small & medium sized organization.   
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Table 4: Bivariate correlation matrix for the latent variables (n = 392). 
 
AFI ECC MCE 
Anti-occupational 
Fraud Investment (AFI) 1.000   
Ethical Corporate 
Culture (ECC) 0.421*** 1.000  
Monitoring Control 
Effectiveness (MCE) 0.357*** 0.624*** 1.000 
 
Notes: ***p < 0.001 
Although Table 4 does not indicate any issues of collinearity, ‘ethical corporate culture’ (3 items) and 
‘effectiveness of monitoring control’ (4 items) appeared to be relatively highly correlated (0.624). To 
ease the concern, an additional exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to compare the 
integrated one-factor solution (7 items) with the original two-factor solution. A series of EFA models 
showed that the original two-factor design (‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘monitoring control 
effectiveness’) was far superior in the model fit indices. 
4. 3. Structural model 
The structural part (shaded in figure 3) was composed of three latent variables and one observed 
variable. A two parallel mediator model was estimated using ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ as 
the exogenous variable; ‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘monitoring control effectiveness’ as two 
mediating variables; the ‘the perceived frequency’ as the endogenous variable. The eight dummy 
variables outside the shaded box were designed to control for the theoretical variables inside the 
shaded area. All the parameters were drawn from 2,000 bootstrap samples. 
Figure 3: Structural equation modeling analysis (n = 392). 
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Notes: solid line (—) = significant effect, dashed line (---) = insignificant effect, dashed-dotted line (-‧-‧) = positive effect, 
dotted line (‧‧‧‧) = negative effect; Unstandardized path coefficient, standard error (parentheses), BC (bias-corrected) 95% 
CI (confidence interval) (brackets), and R-square values are reported.  
 
The structural model demonstrated ideal model fit indices and confirmed a high explanatory power 
(RMSEA = 0.036, CFI = 0.986, TLI = 0.978, SRMR = 0.022). Furthermore, significant variances in the 
theoretical variables were explained by the analytic model: 7.4% in ‘anti-occupational fraud 
investment,’ 37.0% in ‘ethical corporate culture,’ 31.2% in ‘monitoring control effectiveness,’ and 
20.1% in ‘the perceived frequency.’ Among three pathways (one direct and two indirect pathways) in 
the relationship between the exogenous variable and the endogenous variable, only one indirect 
pathway was found to be statistically significant. As expected, ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ 
statistically significantly increased both the ‘ethical corporate culture’ (BC 95% CI [0.336, 0.575]) and 
‘monitoring control effectiveness’ (BC 95% CI [0.281, 0.481]) supporting our hypotheses 2A and 2B. 
However, only the enhanced perception of ‘ethical corporate culture’ sequentially decreased ‘the 
perceived frequency of occupational fraud’ in a statistically significant way (BC 95% CI = [-2.663, -
0.067]) supporting our hypothesis 3A. 
Interestingly, three control variables negatively affected the endogenous variable; those dummy 
variables were ‘the second financial sector’ (BC 95% CI = [-9.121, -4.414]), ‘nationwide bank’ (BC 95% 
CI = [-7.135, -3.315]), and ‘regional bank’ (BC 95% CI = [-9.118, -4.035]). In other words, the 
respondents working for the second financial sector appeared to perceive the smaller frequency of 
occupational fraud than those working for the first financial sector. In a similar vein, the employees 
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working for nationwide and regional bank reported the lower perceived frequency compared to 
those working for savings bank (the reference group). 
In sum, the SEM model demonstrated a full mediation relationship with respect to the indirect 
pathway linking ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ to ‘the perceived frequency’ with ‘ethical 
corporate culture.’ An additional test was conducted to confirm the statistical significance of the 
mediation pathway. As reported in table 5, the linkage of 'anti-occupational fraud investment  ̶  
ethical corporate culture  ̶  the perceived frequency of occupational fraud' was found to be 
statistically significant (BC 95% CI = [-1.316, -0.036]), whereas no significant relationship was found 
in other pathways.  
 
Table 5: Significance test of direct and indirect pathways (n =392). 
Parameter B SE BC 95% CI 
Direct effect    
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→ Perceived frequency of occupational 
fraud 
0.258 0.328 [-0.369, 0.901] 
Indirect effect    
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→  Ethical corporate culture 
→ Perceived frequency of occupational 
fraud 
-0.647 a 0.324 [-1.316, -0.036] 
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→ Monitoring control effectiveness 
→ Perceived frequency of occupational 
fraud 
0.417 0.270 [-0.057, 0.977] 
Notes: a = significantly different from zero 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The S&L Debacle in the US, the Barings Bank fiasco in the UK, the savings bank collapse in Korea, and 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis all around the world have demonstrated how significant the 
consequences of problems in the financial sector can be. However, like other white-collar crimes, 
the invisible and secretive nature of fraud inside the banking institutions has limited the empirical 
analysis so far undertaken in this field. Because of this lack of research, there has been no clear 
evidence about whether organizational investment works for countering occupational fraud, and 
where to focus the investment if it works. In this regard, the present study explored the impact of 
anti-occupational fraud investment and discovered the more effective pathway in preventing 
occupational fraud between two methods expanded from Fraud Triangle Theory.  
The result of our analysis showed that the perception of increased investment has statistically 
significantly enhanced two mediating variables, the ‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘effectiveness of 
monitoring control.’ However, only the perception of an improved ethical culture was negatively 
related to the perceived frequency of occupational fraud with statistical significance. This finding 
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implies that developing an ethical culture is more effective than monitoring controls for the banking 
institutions to prevent occupational fraud. In a similar vein, the COSO’s integrated internal control 
also emphasizes the ‘tone at the top,’ ‘integrity,’ and ‘ethical values’ of organizations as its first 
component of the framework, namely ‘control environment’ (COSO, 2013). However, it should be 
noted that the two mediating variables in our sample were positively correlated (0.624), which hints 
that the two constructs interact for the same end (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Other studies also 
found evidence of the importance of control effectiveness (Johansson and Carey, 2016; Rae and 
Subramaniam, 2008).  
With regard to the reason for ‘monitoring control’ not playing a mediating role in our study, it can be 
explained by several possible hypotheses. Firstly, because the banking sector has traditionally been 
severely regulated compared to other industries, this might have brought fatigue among the 
employees about ‘monitoring control.’ Also, in terms of cultural context, Korea has been historically 
influenced by Confucian ideas stressing a hierarchical group culture (Batzeveg et al., 2017; Jang and 
Hwang, 2014). In such culture, it might be more difficult to prevent management override and 
collusive fraud which are regarded as the Achilles heel of fraud prevention (AICPA, 2016; Tipgos, 
2002). This might have resulted in the employees’ imperfect perception of the effectiveness of 
‘monitoring control.’ Secondly, because most occupational fraud is committed by ‘first time’ 
offenders who are amenable to appeals to morality, not by ‘predators’ who are immune to those 
appeals (Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012; Paternoster and Simpson, 1992), our study indicates that 
setting ethics as the first line of defence is effective in decreasing normal employees’ malpractices in 
organizations (ERC, 2010; Giles, 2015). We believe that these alternative explanations are an 
important area for future research. 
Interestingly, the control variable such as working in the second financial sector (community banks) 
has lowered the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. However, a caution should be made that 
this does not necessarily demonstrate evidence that these banking institutions are safer from 
occupational fraud than the first financial sector. Instead, the finding can be explained by Routine 
Activity Theory, because the first sector is composed of commercial banks with more assets and 
employees (Felson, 2010); if there are more ‘suitable targets’ (assets) and ‘likely offenders’ 
(employees), the organization is likely to suffer from more crime. Furthermore, a smaller number of 
controls (‘capable guardian’) in the community banking institutions might have led to a lower level of 
detection than in the first sector (Bussman and Werle, 2006; Johansson and Carey, 2016).  
Moreover, the investment-culture relationship should be understood in a more nuanced way. In this 
study, we focused on ‘organizational’ investment and culture. The level of investment decided by 
management is the first step to set ‘the strong tone at the top’ in a company. Tversky and 
Kahneman’s prospect theory (1992) implies that crime is a risk-seeking activity by facing the risk of 
punishment. Furthermore, individual perception of risk is affected by psychological framing (Fung, 
2015; Huerta et al., 2012). If developing a strong culture by increasing anti-fraud investment can 
change employees’ perceptions into a low crime and risk-averse pattern, this framing can spread out 
reinforcing virtuous cycles in a company, which will requires less investment in return (Kleiman, 
2010). Therefore, our study gives an important message to CEOs or directors about the investment - 
culture interaction to reduce employee’s malpractice in organizations. 
The present study also has several limitations. First, we directly asked the banking employees about 
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the observed frequency of occupational fraud in the last five years. Of course, there might be gaps 
between actual and perceived fraud levels in companies. However, occupational fraud is regarded as 
so sensitive that it is very difficult to obtain real crime data in the banking industry (Button, 2008). 
Also, such information about illegal activities cannot be traced without potentially compromising the 
anonymity of the respondents. Instead, this study paid attention to the facts that occupational fraud 
could be detected most frequently by employees in a company (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016) and 
respondents are more likely to report that they observed others’ unethical behaviour, rather than 
their own (Trevion et al., 1998). 
Admittedly, the use of a micro-level endogenous variable (i.e., respondents' perceived level of fraud) 
raises concerns about the generalizability of our findings to macro-level set (i.e., fraud at the 
organisational level). Moreover, the mediating variable of ethical corporate culture (as a macro-level 
variable) was designed to predict the lower-level perception variable. Although this mismatched 
analytic framework is not confined to this study (Hechanova et al., 2014; Warren et al., 2014), it is 
still possible for our findings to be faced with a type I error. However, to use both bank type and 
organization size as controls in our analytical models would certainly ease the concerns pertaining to 
the mismatch issue to some extent. In other words, due to data limits, the current model 
specification was the least-worst option. 
Despite the limitations above, our findings are significant because the study discovered an important 
pathway for fighting occupational fraud in organizations. Reducing employee fraud can be best 
achieved only through enhancing the ethical corporate culture, which indicates that the 
internalization of values mediates the relationship between the increased organizational 
investments and desired behavioral outcomes of the employees (Warren et al, 2014). According to 
Bandura’s social learning theory (1977), increased anti-occupational fraud investment will raise the 
moral awareness of employees, which is a critical component of ethical decision making, and in 
sequence will decrease employees’ fraud in organizations. Our findings also concur with the 
renowned corporate crime control strategy (i.e., family model regulation), that strongly enhanced 
organizational culture can buttress individuals’ attitudes to not tolerate peer misconduct in the 
workplace (Braithwaite, 1989) or to use Fisse and Braithwaite’s own words, “If we are serious about 
controlling corporate crime, the first priority should be to create a culture in which corporate crime 
is not tolerated” (1983, 246).   
Furthermore, the current study has important policy implications, which is not confined to the 
Korean banking industry. Recently, Wells Fargo bank in the US, one of the biggest banks in the world, 
was fined by the US regulating authority because millions of fraudulent accounts were created 
without customer’s agreement by some of their employees. The cause was not attributed to the lack 
of sufficient monitoring, but to inadequate organizational ‘practice’ and ‘pressure’ from the top, 
which measured success by the average number of products held by a customer (The New York 
Times, 2016). Therefore, this study can resonate not only through the Korean banking sector but 
also in other countries like the US. Without cultivating corporate culture, through investing in ethical 
leadership, values, and ethics programmes (Button and Brooks, 2009; Schwartz, 2013), monitoring 
controls will do nothing other than generate a “don’t get caught” motivation for employees (Weaver 
and Trevino, 1999). Furthermore, our study also contributes to broadening the current fraud risk 
framework, the Fraud Triangle, by showing that ethical culture should be considered more 
importantly when assessing the fraud risk in organizations. 
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